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Most recent developments in the study of social dilemmas give an increasing amount of
attention to cognition, belief systems, valuations, and language. However, developments in
this ﬁeld operate almost entirely under epistemological assumptions which only recognize
the instrumental form of rationality and deny that “value judgments” or “moral questions”
have cognitive content. This standpoint erodes the moral aspect of the choice situation
and obstructs acknowledgment of the links connecting cognition, inner growth, and moral
reasoning, and the signiﬁcance of such links in reaching cooperative solutions to many
social dilemmas. Concurrently, this standpoint places the role of communication andmutual
understanding in promoting cooperation in morally relevant conﬂicts of action in a rather
mysterious situation. This paper draws on Habermas’s critique of instrumental action, and
on the most recent developments in institutional and behavioral economics with a view
to enhancing our knowledge of the interventions used to cope with social dilemmas. We
conclude the paper with a brief presentation of a research strategy for examining the
capacity of alternative developmental models to predict dissimilar choices under similar
incentive conditions in social dilemmas.
Keywords: social dilemmas, beliefs, value systems, action logics, developmental psychology, communicative
action, institutional analysis
INTRODUCTION
The way one frames an inquiry into any subject has decisive impli-
cations. As a quality inherent to the appeal of frameworks, they
outline limited courses of action and suggest preferred approaches
to a given subject. These deﬁnitions develop from a certain initial
consensus of their protagonists, from whence core propositions,
assumptions, or premises embody a set of methodological deci-
sions which launch the very conditions of possibility of that
research program or discipline. Along with the selected array of
observations or data which they disclose, alternative frameworks
not only propose diverse guidelines to address a certain problem
but also lead to fundamentally distinct viewpoints on the same
phenomenon (Kuhn, 1970). Although different perspectives on
a complex issue should in principle constitute a better picture,
the diverse foundations of alternative theoretical structures and
methods of inquiry commonly create barriers to transdisciplinary
communication.
The policy implications resulting from inquiries resting on
diverse paradigmatic foundations are especially noteworthy when
addressing morally relevant conﬂicts of action such as social
dilemmas: situations of interdependent choices and outcomes
presenting an incongruity between individual and collective
gains. Disagreements involving the governance of common-pool
resources (CPRs) and the provision of public goods are typical
examples. In such situations, assumptions associated with the
standard model of “rational actor” and the economic theory of
“externalities” present a picture where individuals are viewed as
trapped in the “inherent logic” of a situation which “remorselessly
generates tragedy” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244). Regulations imposed
by external authorities are then typically recommended in order
to make up for the “market failures” and prevent regretful
outcomes.
The Bloomington School of Institutional Theory, which
received considerable attention from many scholars studying the
co-governance of CPRs, has exposed the limits of traditional pol-
icy recommendations derived from the conventional economic
theory of externalities for addressing the misuse of ecological
systems. The institutional analysis and development (IAD) frame-
work, in particular, has helped to better understand why in
different circumstances certain social arrangements are sustain-
able over time while others collapse. Copious ﬁeld and laboratory
research inspired by the IAD framework (e.g., Van Lange et al.,
1992; Ostrom et al., 1994; Komorita and Parks, 1995; Lepyard,
1995; Kollock, 1998; Kopelman et al., 2002) has demonstrated that
patterns of social interactions and the likelihood of sustainable
social arrangements for coping with social dilemmas are affected
not only by the structural conﬁgurationof the action arena but also
by the participants’ personal preferences or valuations regarding
the speciﬁc content or context of the choices being made.
On thepractical side, these developments have enabledpolicy to
move beyond the proposition of universal solutions, implemented
by presumably omniscient external authorities, and to recognize
the value of the local people’s knowledge basis and community-
based management institutions for solving problems involving the
appropriation of CPRs and the provision of local public goods
in many locations (e.g., Ostrom, 1990, 2003, 2005; Schlager,
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1990; McKean, 1992; Hackett et al., 1994; Isaac et al., 1994; Tang,
1994; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Wade, 1996; Agrawal, 2001).
On the theoretical side, however, recognition of the most mean-
ingful implications due to Ostrom’s contribution to the ﬁeld of
economic governance requires us to move beyond a simple exten-
sion of economic reasoning to address non-market interactions
and look to the philosophical foundations of the Blooming-
ton School of Institutional Theory. These foundations, mostly
associated with the work of Ostrom (1980, 1982, 1991, 1993),
represent an effort to ground institutional theory on a broad
vision of the human condition, and ultimately suggest that polit-
ical science has been employing the wrong paradigm, and not
simply inadequate models or assumptions (Aligica and Boettke,
2009).
Enshrined in the philosophical foundation of the Bloomington
School is the view of choice as the fundamental deﬁning element
for understanding bothhumanaction and social order and change.
Without relying on any formal deﬁnition of rationality, or reviving
the classic “old institutionalist” critique of economics, the Bloom-
ington School holds a sophisticated view on choice: one which
attempts to make the principle of methodological individualism
coherent with an anthropological and historical understanding of
the“human condition and what it is about that condition that dis-
poses human beings to search out arrangements with one another
that depend upon organization” (Ostrom, 1982, p. 5).
This perspective signiﬁcantly broadens the scope of choices
under analysis and calls for more ﬂexible assumptions about the
actors’ valuations or preferences—-particularly involving intrin-
sic values and the outcome obtained by others. The Bloomington
School suggests that choice in institutional matters refers above
all to choice of ideas, principles and beliefs, rather than choices
about goods and services exchanged in the markets. Compris-
ing the emerging notion of epistemic choice (Aligica and Boettke,
2009), the Bloomington School’s perspective (re)introduces into
the analysis of rational action challenging matters such as prob-
lem deﬁnition, representation of incentives, and interpretation of
the action situation and environmental feedbacks. Thus, accord-
ing to the Bloomington School’s view, a theory of institutions
and social order should be grounded on an adequate theory of
ideas—-one that intrinsically links preferences and choices onnor-
mative issues to knowledge, learning, and their essential means:
language and communication. A comparable emphasis on cogni-
tion, learning, and communication also characterizes what North
and colleagues propose as the brand new “cognitive institutional-
ism”(cf. North, 1990,2005; Denzau andNorth,2000;Mantzavinos
et al., 2004).
However, it is our contention that the development of the real
theoretical, methodological and operational potential associated
with the cognitivist approaches to social order has been burdened
by a tacit adherence to a speciﬁc epistemological conception of
rationality and justiﬁability, known as foundationalism, which ulti-
mately denies that “value judgments” or “moral questions” have
cognitive content. Since what is not cognitive cannot be rationally
justiﬁed, this view clearly makes it problematic to develop a the-
ory of rational action aimed at illuminating the role of knowledge,
learning processes and communication in copingwithmorally rel-
evant conﬂicts of action, like most social dilemmas. As Habermas
(1993) observed, admitting that moral judgments do have cogni-
tive content, that is, that “they represent more than expressions
of contingent emotions, preferences, and decisions of a speaker
or actor” (Habermas, 1990, p. 120), is vital for (re)establishing
the internal connection between norms and justifying grounds.
This connection, which, in Habermas’s terminology, constitutes
the rational foundation of normative validity (Habermas, 1993, p.
41), is evidently indispensable for admitting that social norms
can be justiﬁed using arguments, rather than simply imposed by
coercion or force. Moral cognitivism is likewise needed in order to
admit that rational agents can follow norms also on the grounds of
their recognition of the norms’ validity, rather than on the exclu-
sive basis of utilitarian calculus, or because of some non-rational
motive.
This issue pertaining to the epistemology of moral judgments,
even though commonly overlooked, is clearly central to the anal-
ysis of situations where individual and collective interests conﬂict;
as it is to the Bloomington School’s whole attitude and approach to
polycentric order and social dilemmas, viewed as an attempt to give
a positive answer to the question posed by Alexander Hamilton in
the opening paragraph of The Federalist on “whether societies of
men are really capable or not of establishing good government
from reﬂection and choice, or whether they are forever destined
to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force”
(Ostrom, 1971, p. 15). However, though hidden away beneath the
IAD framework, the foundationalist epistemology drives its pro-
ponents, as most social theorists do, “to assume that instrumental
action is the only form of rational action, and that norm-governed
action must have some kind of non-rational source” (Heath, 2001,
p. 2). It is this epistemological core, in our view, which underlies
the Bloomington School’s ultimate adherence to a functional-
ist explanation of choice on institutional matters (and epistemic
choices, more generally), wherein human valuations, ethics, and
concern for others are subtly reduced to “a particular form of
selection and adaptive behavior,” embodied as “social habits” or
“social emotions,” supposedly ﬁxed through gene-culture, co-
evolutionary processes (cf. e.g., Boyd and Richerson, 1990, 1992;
Bowles and Gintis, 2003; Ostrom, 2005). But then, contrary to
what is intended (see cf. Ostrom, 1991, p. 11; Aligica and Boet-
tke, 2009, p. 77), by adding on this functionalist-naturalistic kind
of explanation of human sociability, the Bloomington School’s
approach to institutions does not fundamentally depart from
the modes of analysis copied from natural sciences. Actually,
what is crucial to explaining the coherence and adaptability of
norm-governed systems without abandoning the action frame
of reference (and supplying only functionalist explanations of
these norms) is the acknowledgment of moral cognitivism, which
can only be accomplished on the grounds of a dialogical (non-
foundationalist) conception of rationality and justiﬁability (cf.
Heath, 2008).
AsHabermaswas one of the ﬁrst to bring a non-foundationalist
epistemology to the task of understanding the logic of social
action, his defense of moral cognitivism is integral to his develop-
mental account of the human capacity to coordinate interaction
through communicative action. The cognitivist view on moral
judgments is likewise needed for an appreciation of the hypoth-
esis and empirical strategy we put forward in this study, with a
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view to deepening our knowledge of social dilemmas and sup-
porting the design of more suitable institutions to cope with
them.
First, the essentials of the situation in focus are introduced.
Without negating the suitability of the usual characterization of
the problem in various contexts, we argue against the general-
ization of the conclusions and policy recommendations which
arise from the particular perspective onmotivation and rationality
assumed in the standard economic approach to the problem. Next,
in order to illustrate the inadequacy of such generalizations, we
address the disputed role of communication in promoting cooper-
ation among individuals who strive to solve their social dilemmas
by themselves. We refer to the framework provided by the Bloom-
ington School of Institutional Theory (Ostrom, 2007; Aligica
and Boettke, 2009) and the so-called cognitive institutionalism
(Mantzavinos et al., 2004) to show how epistemic choice—-and
the associated interplay between beliefs, valuations, communica-
tion and institutions—-has been addressed within the frames of
instrumental action alone. Following Habermas (1984, 1987), we
continue to argue that, as this perspective still severs the inter-
nal connection between norms and justifying grounds, it conceals
the non-instrumental feature of rational action, thus distorting
the signiﬁcance of communication in producing normative agree-
ments inmorally relevant conﬂicts of action. Onworking as a blind
paradigm, foundationalism discredits moral argumentation—-
over and above any form of spiritual knowledge—-and redirects
both research and teaching about social dilemmas toward an
exclusively instrumental-utilitarian approach. While admitting
that different methods are performative of different realities (Law
and Urry, 2003; Esbjorn-Hargens, 2007), we bring the article
to a close by highlighting the signiﬁcance of moving beyond
foundationalism in future education systems in order to restore
the rational basis of value judgments and spiritual knowledge,
which are believed to be of relevance for better addressing social
dilemmas.
THE ESSENTIALS OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS
So-called social dilemmas include a variety of social interactions
in which the individual and collective interests conﬂict. In a social
dilemma, the individual’s sensible self-interested behavior gener-
ates a situation in which everyone is worse off. The individuals
in question are said to be facing a “social dilemma” because they
would all be better off if they found a way to cooperate but there
is no incentive for them to bear the costs of cooperation (Ostrom,
2007).
One of the most renowned illustrations of social dilemmas was
provided by Hardin (1968) in his much cited The Tragedy of the
Commons. In that essay, Hardin describes a pasture which is open
to all, in which each herdsman receives a private beneﬁt from
adding animals to graze on the commons and incurs only delayed
costs from his and others’ potential overgrazing. On generalizing
the standard model of economic rationality, Hardin goes on to
suggest that “as a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize
his own gain” (ibid, p. 1244). The herdsmen are assumed to pur-
sue short-term, material beneﬁts for themselves and to ignore the
immediate consequences for others and the long-term results for
all. In Hardin’s text, each rational herdsman concludes that:
. . .the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal
to his herd. And another; and another. . .. But this is the conclusion
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons.
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels
him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin
is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own
best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons
(Hardin, 1968, pp. 1244–1245).
Many of the most challenging dilemmas, ranging from
interpersonal to intergroup issues, are social dilemmas at their
core1. Furthermore, as Ostrom (2007) remarks, when relatively
anonymous individuals independently make decisions which are
primarily intended to satisfy their own interests, Hardin’s predic-
tions do tend to be veriﬁed, both in the ﬁeld and in laboratory
settings (cf. Ostrom et al., 1994; Cárdenas, 2000; Casari and Plott,
2003; Cárdenas and Ostrom, 2004).
Hardin’s approach may thus be adequate for characterizing a
scenario which will lead to the overexploitation of many open
access resources, such as pastures, forests, and water sources, and
to the pollution of air sheds, landscapes, and water courses. In
addressing such problems, the standard theory points to the lack of
speciﬁcproperty rights as the only cause of the social dilemmas and
does not question the postulates regarding individual motivation
and rationality. The policy recommendations which address these
problems, therefore, work solely to increase the alternatives which
could correct this institutional failure. As Hardin acknowledges,
each alternative has its own beneﬁts and drawbacks. “But we must
choose,” he says, “or acquiesce in the destruction of the commons
(. . .)” (p. 1245).
In our view, however, the challenge is to show that our inability
to cope with many social dilemmas originates less from our belief
“in the freedom of the commons,” as Hardin believes, but from
our belief in a blinding conception of rationality that compels us
to assume that “instrumental action is the only form of rational
action, and that norm-governed action must have some kind of
non-rational source, such as conditioning, socialization, or habit”
(Heath, 2001, p. 2).
This viewpoint erodes the potential of self-organization to solve
social dilemmas locally and justiﬁes the intervention of external
authorities and the use of coercive means. By assuming that self-
interested behavior is the only form of rational behavior, in these
circumstances, the standard approach to social dilemmas down-
plays the moral aspect of the situation and neglects the value of
educational practices which are intended to foster responsibility
and encourage self-organization. Hardin (1968) himself does so
quite directly. For him, in the absence of substantial sanctions,
“responsibility is a verbal counterfeit for a substantial quid pro
quo. It is an attempt to get something for nothing” (p. 1247).
On this basis, Hardin regards any attempt to instill a sense
of responsibility in others as “tempting to anyone who wishes to
extend his control beyond the legal limits” (p. 1247). He goes so far
as to draw on Batson’s “double bind” situation—-hypothesized as
being part of the genesis of schizophrenia—-in order to denounce
1The famous Prisoner’s Dilemma and the so-called Assurance and Chicken games
illustrate key two-person social dilemmas. The provision of public goods and the
governance of common-pool resources are typical examples of multiple-person
social dilemmas.
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the “serious pathogenic effects” resulting from any appeal to the
responsibility of individuals that is intended to regulate social
interactions (ibid).
Batson’s double bind theory regarding the origin of schizophre-
nia involves the same sort of contradiction between verbal and
non-verbal communication which Hardin applies in the Tragedy
of the Commons, thereby implying a necessary skepticism about
any plea to “conscience” regarding the regulation of resource use
in the absence of sanctions. However, Batson’s double bind princi-
ple involves a strong emotional and unidirectional message from a
mother to her infant, who cannot dispel the anxiety brought about
by the contradiction through further communication (cf. Bateson,
1972, 1979; Tarnas, 1999, p. 445). Clearly, linguistic communica-
tion among adults working to overcome their collective action
problems is different in this respect; what Hardin actually pre-
sumes is that moral claims and verbal promises are fundamentally
non-binding.
This view regarding the inconsequence of verbal agreements
emerges less from a belief in the wicked nature of humans than
from a particular epistemological perspective known as founda-
tionalism, which eventually leads to moral non-cognitivism, i.e.,
the view that moral ideas have no cognitive content or ratio-
nal justiﬁcation. This epistemological underpinning has decisive
implications for howwe explain rational choice inmorally relevant
conﬂicts of action, particularly as it biases our view of the role of
communication in producing normative commitments. The fol-
lowing sections expand on the epistemological issue and on how
it relates with the developmental perspective on action logics and
valuations.
RECOGNIZING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BARRIER TO THE
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON VALUATIONS
A number of factors have been obstructing recognition of the
implications of many reputed developmental models in approach-
ing rational action in social sciences. One basic difﬁculty ensues
from the common belief that psychosocial development refers
to childhood and adolescence, that is, to the ﬁrst 20 years
of life. “Traditionally,” as Marchand (2005), puts it, “experts
in developmental psychology analyzed the growth of the child
and of the adolescent, holding that development ends before
adult life begins” (cf. e.g., Inhelder and Piaget, 1955; Piaget,
1970/1972). Were that the case, such a fact would evidently
move the developmental framework out of the realm of serious
consideration for addressing social dilemmas, since the actors
involved in most relevant situations are typically adult humans.
Currently, however, researches are coming to an increasing under-
standing that human subjective and intersubjective developments
do indeed have the potential to evolve all the way through
adult life (Graves, 1971; Riegel, 1973; Arlin, 1975; Basseches,
1980; Kramer, 1983; Commons and Richards, 1984; Pascual-
Leone, 1984; Sinnott, 1984, 1989; Commons et al., 1989; and
others).
A second difﬁculty is that each of the numerous facets or
streams of consciousness comprising the overall self appears to
have its own internal drives or laws of transformation toward
greater complexity and integration. When considered in its
entirety, the overall self of particular individuals does not show
a sequential or stage-like development, but appears instead as a
rather ﬂuid ﬂowing affair, with much overlapping and interweav-
ing (Wilber, 2000, p. 34). The simple intuition of what seems
to be an almost inﬁnite number of multiple modalities of indi-
vidual personalities stirs a natural sense of incommensurability
supporting ordinary relativistic objections against the stage devel-
opmental framework in general. However, modern psychological
structuralism takes all that intertwining into account and entails
careful methodological design for assessing particular streams of
consciousness and speciﬁc self-related competencies, which are
deﬁned as capacities not only to solve but also to recognize the
very existence of particular types of problems (e.g., empirical-
analytic, moral-practical, or interpersonal relationship). Along
these lines, as Wilber (ibid) reports, the bulk of research has
continued to ﬁnd that each self-related developmental line itself
tends to unfold in a stage-like, sequential, and nested hierar-
chical fashion, and that self ’s center of gravity, so to speak,
tends to hover around one basic action logic at any one time
(p. 35). Furthermore, according to him, “One of the striking
things about the present state of developmental studies is how
similar, in broad outline, most of its models are” (p. 5). In
fact, by comparing a sizeable number of developmental mod-
els and theories, Richards and Commons (1990) also indicate
that “[t]he stage sequence [in all of those theories and modes]
can be aligned across a common developmental space,” and that,
“[t]he harmony of alignment shown suggests a possible rec-
onciliation of [these] theories. . .” (p. 160; see also Commons,
1981).
Yet, when it comes to the subject of morally relevant conﬂicts
of action, as in social dilemmas, acknowledgment of the devel-
opmental framework is obstructed most of all by the common
idea that “value judgments” or “moral questions” are rationally
undecidable. As Heath (2001) indicates, a critical consequence
of this view, often unstated, is that “most social theorists simply
assume that any agent who acts on the basis of a moral princi-
ple, or social norm, is not rationally justiﬁed in doing so” (p. 2).
According to him, “This is what underlies the widespread ten-
dency among social theorists to assume that instrumental action
is the only form of rational action, and that norm-governed action
must have some kind of non-rational source, such as condition-
ing, socialization, or habit” (ibid). Heath further points to how
the presumption of non-rationality tempts one to abandon the
action frame of reference and supply purely functionalist expla-
nations for the coherence of norm systems and the adaptability
of norm-governed action. This trend is noticeable in the cur-
rent vogue for the sociobiological evolutionary framework for
explaining human sociability and adherence to norms—-visible
also in the Bloomington approach to the stability of normative
agreements.
As suggested, the previously mentioned obstruction is episte-
mological in nature. In Heath’s words, the “traditional reason for
thinking that normative commitments are irrational, or unjusti-
ﬁable, depends upon a rather speciﬁc conception of rationality
and justiﬁability known as foundationalism” (ibid, p. 2). As Heath
(2001) summarizes it, foundationalism is a theory of justiﬁcation
intended to provide an answer to the fundamental problem in
epistemology: the problem of inﬁnite regress. Foundationalism
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suggests that any attempt to justify a given statement inferentially
generates an inﬁnite regress of new arguments which could be
introduced in support of that statement but which will contain
premises which in themselves require justiﬁcation. The only way
to break this cycle, Heath remarks (p. 197), is to use the conclusion
as a premise (i.e., use circular reasoning) or simply break the chain
of reasons (i.e., make an undefended assumption).
Foundationalism represents an instance of the latter strategy,
as it holds that there is a class of “basic” beliefs (also called foun-
dational beliefs) which are intrinsically (i.e., non-inferentially)
justiﬁed by virtue of their empirical content. Foundational beliefs
are said to be self-justifying or self-evident to the extent that
they are not justiﬁed by beliefs or constructs other than sensorial
perception.
Because validity claims concerning moral statements and
normative commitments cannot be grounded in any direct expe-
rience with the physical world, the foundationalist epistemology
implies that these judgments are essentially non-cognitive (therein
moral non-cognitivism). Even though many social scientists have
abandoned positivism as methodological stances, the founda-
tionalist conception of rationality and justiﬁability is still widely
accepted.
This epistemological underpinning has obvious implications
for how we explain rational choice in morally relevant conﬂicts of
action. In particular, this view inﬂuences our understanding of the
role of communication in producing normative commitments in
these situations.
While the instrumental conception of rationality does not itself
presuppose or depend on any sort of moral non-cognitivism
(Heath, 2001), the foundationalist standpoint is probably what
explains, for instance, Hardin’s (1968) emphatic repudiation of
moral argumentation for addressing the commons dilemmas, as
previously illustrated.
BEYOND FOUNDATIONALISM: TOWARD STAGES OF MORAL
REASONING
In the preceding section, we attempted to show that because
moral non-cognitivism holds that moral judgments are purely
relative, it conﬂicts with the idea that social norms can be justiﬁed
using arguments, rather than simply being imposed by coer-
cion or force. It also conﬂicts with the idea that rational agents
can obey norms on the grounds of recognition of the norm’s
validity, rather than exclusively considering a utilitarian calcu-
lus or some non-rational motive. These limitations motivated
Habermas (1984, 1987) to maintain that instrumental models
do not provide a sufﬁcient basis for a general theory of rational
action.
Heath (2001) indicates that a common response to the relativist
point of view on morals has been that of accepting the formal
component of the foundationalist analysis, and seeking only to
deny the narrow empiricist list of belief-types that are claimed
to be available for “objective validation.” However, he also notes
that these theories suffer from well-known difﬁculties; thus, the
relativist position seems quite strong in this context. Conversely,
rooted in the new paradigm of epistemology generated by the
linguistic turn, Habermas’s strategy in responding to the relativist
stance onmorality denies the force of the regress argument entirely
and is governed by a non-foundationalist defense of the cognitivist
conception of moral judgment.
Following Heath’s (2001) outline, Habermas’s discourse-
theoretic view has two basic components. First, Habermas claims
that non-cognitivist concerns about the truth-aptness of moral
judgments is important only if one assumes that the truth repre-
sents some kind of correspondence relationship between sentences
and the state of affairs in the world2. If one denies that this sort of
“objectivity” plays any role in vindicating the truth-claims associ-
ated with beliefs, then our ability to justify beliefs has nothing to
do with their reference to the physical world (i.e., with the knowl-
edge of what can be enacted using individuals’ ordinary senses
and their extension). Similarly, when the relativist questions the
ultimate justiﬁability of moral judgments, the argument is persua-
sive only if it presupposes a “monological” conception of rational
justiﬁcation (i.e., when justiﬁcation is tacitly treated as a process
which involves only the agent’s cognitive states and the objects
of representation). This assumption has the effect of reducing all
public practices of justiﬁcation so that they are either secondary
or derivative. However, if one assumes, as Habermas does, that
justiﬁcation is always dialogical—a process involving an attempt to
justify a claim to some other person, so that justiﬁcation to others
is taken as the primary phenomenon—then there is no a priori
reason to think that moral questions are any less decidable than
empirical or scientiﬁc ones.
In summary, Habermas suggests that one can defeat moral
non-cognitivism by rejecting the traditional project of ana-
lytic epistemology, including both the received (correspondence)
theory of truth and the received (foundationalist) view of justiﬁca-
tion. Heath (2001, p. 198) also suggests that one reason why some
theorists have taken thismore radical step is that“foundationalism
does not offer a very persuasive justiﬁcation for any kind of belief,
including empirical ones.”
Despite the revolutionary tone of this epistemological turn,
“the ﬁrst thing to notice about Habermas’s theory of commu-
nicative action” as Heath (2001, p. 13) observes, “is that it is a
typological theory” (emphasis in the original). In presenting his
theory of communicative action, Habermas does not reject the
instrumental conception of rationality. As Heath (ibid) explains,
Habermas takes as his point of departure that agents have access
to a set of different, often incommensurable, standards of choice,
or action logics. Communicative action is action governed by
a particular standard—-namely, that of achieving understand-
ing—-whereas instrumental action is action that is governed by a
different standard: that of achieving success.
According to Habermas’s typology, instrumental action and
speech acts form two “elementary forms of action” (Figure 1).
The introduction of a second agent generates social action, under-
stood as a complex phenomenon constructed through interaction
between the two elementary forms of action. According to this
view, rational agents engaged in social action always face the
problem of interdependent expectations, which can be resolved
by drawing on the resources of either instrumental action or
speech. When the actors are primarily interested in the conse-
quences, social action becomes strategic action in the standard
2Habermas is referring to the Correspondence Theory of Truth.
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FIGURE 1 | Elementary action types combine to produce social action types. Source: adapted from Heath (2001, p. 25).
game-theoretic sense. However, when speech is used to coordinate
the regress of anticipations, it generates that form of action which
Habermas characterizes as communicative action (cf. Habermas,
1990, p. 133).
This basic scheme is indicated by the straight lines in Figure 1.
The upward oblique line indicates that communicative action
is not the same as speech. Like strategic action, communicative
action also presupposes the basic teleological structure of action
inasmuch as the actors are assumed to continue to conduct their
plans to attain a particular state of affairs. In Habermas’s words,
the two social action types differ in that “for the model of strate-
gic action, a structural description of the action directly oriented
toward success is sufﬁcient, whereas the model of action oriented
toward reaching understanding must specify the propositions of
an agreement to be reached communicatively that allows alter to
link his action to ego’s” (where the alter and ego are persons; ibid,
p. 134). In other words, when engaged in communicative action,
actors are assumed to be “prepared to harmonize their plans of
action through internal means, committing themselves to pursu-
ing their goals only on the condition of an agreement—-one that
already exists or one to be negotiated—-about deﬁnitions of the
situation and prospective outcomes” (ibid).
Empathy-based justice/fairness concepts are possible key
notions in such communicative negotiations. Following the
affect-cognition synthesis (cf. Damásio, 1995), contemporary
research has pointed to the contribution of empathy to prosocial
action, moral judgment, and to resolving caring-justice conﬂicts
(Hoffman, 2000). While viewed as a multidetermined affective
response ultimately emerging from natural selection, the bio-
graphic arousal of empathy and empathy-charged justice/fairness
scripts has been described as a developmental process entrenched
within cognition, memory, information processing, and causal
attribution (ibid).
When considering the empirical differences in the extent to
which different groups or societies depend on explicitly discur-
sive procedures to secure social integration, Habermas offers a
plain stage developmental account. In broad lines, his argument is
aimed at showing that the stages that occur in his historical recon-
struction of the development of communicative action, which
takes the form of an interpretation of studies by Durkheim and
Mead3, are recapitulated in the ontogenesis of our capacity for
speech and action, and are isomorphic to the stages described
3This phylogenetic account is in the ﬁfth chapter of The Theory of Communicative
Action (1984/1987, v. 2).
in Laurence Kohlberg’s model of the development of sociocogni-
tive and moral reasoning4. The connecting links are provided by
Selman (1980) account of sociocognitive development in relation
to stages of social perspective taking, which Habermas reformu-
lates in terms of structures of social interaction (see Table 1).
“The point of this chain of argument is to connect structures of
moral judgment to structures of social interaction in such a way
that their developmental-logical features stand out more clearly”
(McCarthy, 1990, p. ix)5.
By deﬁning discourse as a reﬂective form of communicative
action, Habermas situates the morally relevant presuppositions
of practical argumentation as the tail end and point of reference
in a constructivist learning process, in which complex forms of
social action have given rise to competences resting on repeatedly
reorganized sociocognitive inventories and perspective structures
which, in turn, have permitted the emergence of more sophis-
ticated forms of action. Viewed within the development of a
complex structure of perspectives which culminates in a decen-
tered understanding of the world, displayed by subjects who act
with an orientation toward reaching understanding, Habermas
distinguishes stages of interaction in terms of different achieve-
ments of coordination, expressing a development that is directed
and cumulative.
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION REQUIRES MORE SOCIOCOGNITIVE
CAPACITIES THAN STRATEGIC ACTION
Skipping the details of Habermas’s reconstruction, we single out
only those reasonswhy, according to him, the ability to act from the
perspective of a strict concept of morality (as an autonomous and
rational sense of duty) can evolve only at the post-conventional
level, while the ability for acting strategically requires only an
updating of the structure of perspective applying to the precon-
ventional level, without requiring any further reorganization of
the sociocognitive inventory.
To show that this occurs, Habermas ﬁrst redeﬁnes the precon-
ventional types of action in terms of forms of reciprocity linked
4The ontogenetic ground of Habermas’s onto-phylogenetic parallel is developed
in the fourth chapter of Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1990).
The interested reader may also wish to consult the third chapter of Justiﬁcation and
Application (Habermas, 1993).
5The authors are aware of and acknowledge the pitfalls of close parallels between
phylogenetic and ontogenetic development, like the risk of some kind of teleological
progressivism or Euro-America-centrism where “democratic contract” and “indi-
vidual principles” appear as the highest level to which all developmental processes
tend.
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to different structures of behavioral expectations (not shown in
Table 1). In this fashion, interaction controlled by authority is
redeﬁned in terms of an asymmetrical form of reciprocity which
tends to operate whenever the authority for controlling the con-
tributions of others to the interaction is unequal, as in the case of
the family. Conversely, the symmetrical form of reciprocity oper-
ates when the participants exercise mutual control over their
contributions to the interaction, as for example, in egalitarian
friendship (p. 147). These differentiations are correspondingly
reﬂected in two different forms of action coordination: authority-
governed complementarity, and interest-governed reciprocity, to
which actors can resort in the face of both cooperative and
competitive relationships.
Habermas suggests that authority-governed complementarity
and interest-governed symmetrical social relations deﬁne two dif-
ferent types of interaction which can embody the same perspective
structure, namely: the reciprocity of action perspectives typical
of Selman’s level 2 of perspective taking (Table 1). According
to Selman, children at this level possess a sociocognitive inven-
tory which enables them to control interactions by deception
if necessary. An asymmetry between the developmental requi-
sites for strategic action and action oriented toward reaching
understanding starts to emerge as we recognize that in cooper-
ative relationships, the participants renounce the use of deception,
whereas in authority-governed relationships, the dependent part-
ner cannot resort to deception, even in cases of conﬂict. “Hence,
the option of inﬂuencing alter’s behavior by means of deception
exists only when ego construes the social relationship as symmet-
rical and interprets the action situation in terms of conﬂicting
needs” (ibid, p. 148).
As shown in Table 1, Habermas correlates the justice concept
based on the complementarity of order and obedience, which
is built into Kohlberg’s ﬁrst stage of moral reasoning, with the
considerations that will guide action when one sees oneself as
dependent, and tries to resolve the conﬂict between ego’s needs and
alter’s demands by avoiding threatened sanctions. On the other
hand, the concept of justice based on the symmetry of compen-
sation, set in Kohlberg’s second moral stage, emerges only when
one starts to see power as distributed equally, and may try to avail
oneself of the possibilities for deception which exist in symmetri-
cal relations. Habermas then brings up results from Flavell et al.’s
(1968) experiment in order to trace the reorganization of the pre-
conventional stage of interaction and show how strategic action
comes to be differentiated from competitive behavior.
In Flavell’s experiment, two cups concealing different amounts
of money are put upside down on a table. Each cup bears a
label in plain view indicating the payoff value supposedly hidden
under the cup. The participants are shown that the relationship
between the inscription and the actual amount hidden can be
varied at will. Ego’s task is to secretly distribute the payoffs in
such a way that alter will fail to guess where the greater amount
is hidden. The point of the game is clear: alter will try to win as
much as she can, and ego will try to prevent this by means of
deception.
Habermas points out that if the participants in the experiment
have the perspective structure of Selman’s level 2 (see Table 1)
they will choose what Flavell called strategy B. Following strategy
B, alter chooses the cup labeled “lower payoff,” as she reasons that
egowants to fool her by not concealing the higher payoff under the
cup labeled “higher payoff.” On the other hand, participants who
are able to engage in Selman’s level 3 of perspective taking will
choose Flavell’s strategy C, which is a mixing strategy emerging
from the recognition that alter sees through ego’s strategy B.As this
mutual (symmetrical) recognition establishes an inﬁnite regress
of anticipations, strategy C arises out of alter’s realization that the
chance of losing is as great as the chance of winning, no matter
what she decides to do.
Habermas suggests that strategy C is characteristic of a type
of action only possible at the conventional stage of interaction
(Table 1), because it requires a coordination of observer and
participant perspectives lacking at Selman’s level 2, but neces-
sary for the restructuring of preconventional competitive behavior
into strategic action. It is this shift which, according to Haber-
mas, allows ego to attribute stability over time to alter’s pattern
of attributes and preferences, so that alter stops being perceived
as someone whose actions are determined by shifting needs and
interests and begins to be viewed as a subject who intuitively fol-
lows rules of rational action. “Beyond this, however, no structural
change in the sociocognitive inventory is required. In all other
respects the preconventional inventory is adequate for the strategic
actor” (1990, p. 150).
On the other hand, as Habermas puts it, the passage to
normatively regulated action cannot be adapted so economi-
cally to the conventional stage of interaction. According to him,
preconventional modes of coordinating action come under pres-
sure in areas of behavior not dominated by competition, where
deception is precluded. In these situations the sociocognitive
inventory does require a global reconstruction to make room
for a mechanism of non-strategic coordination of action. As
Habermas explains, this mechanism must be independent of
authority relations to an actual reference person and of direct
links to self-interests, so that “this stage of conventional but non-
strategic action requires basic sociocognitive concepts revolving
around the notion of a suprapersonal will” (ibid, p. 152). Haber-
mas then goes on to discuss the structural breaks underlying his
justiﬁcation of the developmental sequence associated with the
emergence of different concepts and institutions embodying the
idea of a suprapersonal authority, such as loyalty to social roles
and legitimacy of rules (see Table 1). Concepts and intuitions
of this kind provide the elements for constituting a social world
of legitimately ordered interpersonal relations and for judging
actions according to whether or not they conform to or vio-
late socially recognized norms. At the conventional level, these
judgments connect, in turn, with the justice concepts of confor-
mity to roles and conformity to systems of norms, as shown in
Table 1.
At this point, Habermas indicates that the complex structure of
perspectives—-objective, social, and subjective—-underpinning
normatively regulated interactions satisﬁes the structural precon-
ditions of a communicative action in which individual plans of
action are coordinated by means of a mechanism for reaching
understanding through communication (ibid, p. 158).
According to Habermas, the third stage of interaction, that
is, discourse (Table 1), takes form only when communicative
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action becomes fully reﬂexive. At this stage, the complexity of
the perspective structure undertakes further growth in order to
make room for the hypothetical attitude which characterizes the
decentered understanding of the world and allows participants in
argumentation to leave behind the horizon of the unquestioned,
intersubjectively shared, non-thematized certitudes of a quasi-
natural social world in order to focus on and test validity claims
that are initially raised implicitly in communicative action and are
naively carried out along with it. As Habermas explains, the struc-
tural leap is marked by the synthesis of the two systems of world
perspectives and speaker perspectives. “On the one hand, the sys-
tem of world perspectives, which has been refracted, as it were, by
the hypothetical attitude, is [now] constitutive of claims of valid-
ity that are thematized in argumentations. On the other hand, the
system of fully reversible speaker perspectives is constitutive of the
framework within which participants in argumentation can reach
rationally motivated agreement” (p. 159).
In discourse, then, the two systems which had been fully devel-
oped at the second stage of the conventional level are put in
relationship to one another. At the same time, the prior polarity
involving communicative and strategic action is overcome in dis-
course, as the success-orientationof competitors is assimilated into
argumentation. AsHabermas explains, what happens in argumen-
tation is that “proponents and opponents engage in a competition
with arguments in order to convince one another, that is, in order
to reach a consensus” (ibid, p. 160). Actually, the condition that
arguments are not regressively reduced to mere means of inﬂuenc-
ing each other, as is often presumed along with an exclusionary
instrumental conception of rationality, is what distinguishes the
communicative from the strategic use of communication. “In dis-
course,” Habermas says, “what is called the force of the better
argument is wholly unforced” (ibid).
Thus, “[i]n the light of hypothetical claims to validity the
world of existing states of affairs is theorized, that is, becomes
a matter of theory, and the world of legitimately ordered rela-
tions is moralized, that is, becomes a matter of morality” (ibid,
p. 161). This “moralization of society” undermines the norma-
tive power of the factual, so that institutions which have lost their
quasi-natural character can be turned into “so many instances
of problematic justice” (ibid). A new reorganization of the fun-
damental sociocognitive concepts available at the stage of role
behavior andnormatively governed interactionbecomesnecessary
in order to rationally justify the “uprooted and now free-ﬂowing
systems of norms” (ibid). At the post-conventional level, norms
of action are subordinated to principles, or higher-order norms.
“The notion of the legitimacy of norms of action is now divided
into the components of mere de facto recognitions and worthiness
to be recognized” (ibid). Correspondingly, a parallel differentia-
tion occurs in the concept of duty, where “respect for the law is no
longer considered an ethical motive per se” (ibid). To dependence
on existing norms is opposed“the demand that the agent make the
validity rather than the social currency of a norm the determin-
ing ground of his action” (ibid). That is, to autonomy is opposed
heteronomy (Table 1).
In short, Habermas claims that a strict (cognitivist, univer-
salist, formalist) concept of morality can evolve only at the
post-conventional stage, for “only at the post-conventional stage
is the social world uncoupled from the stream of cultural givens”
(ibid, p. 162). Tobe sure, it is precisely the sight of plural relativism,
which comes into view at the post-conventional stage, which
makes the autonomous justiﬁcation of morality an unavoidable
problem (ibid).
Now, if Habermas’s action-theoretic account of the develop-
ment of the sought-after moral point of view admittedly requires
distinctions which are not easy to operationalize, the difﬁculty
in understanding how the conceptions of justice emerge from the
sociocognitive inventory of the corresponding stages of interaction
can be facilitated by a key insight. This insight, which Haber-
mas properly attributes to Durkheim, is that there is no speciﬁc
socialization process through which agents acquire moral disposi-
tions. As Habermas puts it, “[i]n trying to understand this process,
one has to take into account that the normatively regulated fab-
ric of social relations is moral in and of itself, as Durkheim has
shown” (ibid, p. 164, emphasis in the original). In Heath’s (2001)
words, “This means that acquiring the competences required to
manage routine social interactions amounts to acquiring the dis-
positions and personality structures that we understand to be
essential elements of moral agency” (p. 8).
As Habermas plainly recognizes, a hypothetical reconstruction
of the type sketched above can at best serve as a guide for fur-
ther research. With this intent we present, in Table 1, Graves’s
emergent-stage conception of adult personality systems devel-
opment. The connecting points were provided by Graves’s own
correlation analysis involving the stages advanced in his concep-
tion and those described in Kohlberg’s model (cf. Graves, 2005, p.
443)6.
Without going on to describe the substance of these correla-
tions, the next section is only aimed at illustrating the implica-
tions of our suggested integration of the cognitive-developmental
account of moral agency with an analysis of institutional change
and development in the context of social dilemmas.
ON THE PARTIALNESS OF THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL’S
ACCOUNT OF MORAL CHOICES AND THE ROLE OF
COMMUNICATION
The conceptual scaffoldings supplied by the Bloomington School
have undergone a series of transformations since Governing the
Commons (Ostrom, 1990). Figure 2 is one of the latest attempts to
portray the structure of complex governance problems involv-
ing integrated social-ecological systems (SESs). It represents a
response to the challenge presented to SES scholars in their search
for a proper language “to map and explore the institutional, prax-
eological, and normative complexity of polycentric systems of
human governance” (Aligica and Boettke, 2009, p. 29).
The map starts from the prior recognition that many vari-
ables affect the patterns of interactions and outcomes in such
systems. It was conceived to help SES scholars “examine the nested
6As previously suggested, we regard contemporary research on the development
of empathy as an additional source of indirect validation of Habermas’s account.
In Hoffman (2000), for instance, the interested reader will ﬁnd a comprehensive
account of the arousal of empathy, involving a passage from preverbal, automatic,
and essentially involuntary modes to higher-order modes of empathy entrenched
within the development of cognitive, communicative and perspective-taking
capacities.
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FIGURE 2 | A multi-tier framework for analyzing interactions and
outcomes in a linked social-ecological system (straight arrows
represent direct causal links: curved arrows represent feedbacks).
Source: Ostrom (2009).
attributes of a resource system and the resource units generated
by that system that jointly affect the incentives of users within a
set of rules crafted by local, distal or nested governance systems
to affect interactions and outcomes over time” (Ostrom, 2007, p.
15181).
Figure 2 shows only the most abstract level of analysis of a
generic SES. To investigate real problems in focal SESs, scholars
are required to “unpack” each one of the compound units shown
in the ﬁgure in as many tiers as necessary to reach the relevant data
for the particular question under study.When unpacking the com-
ponent unit “users” (U),Ostrom (2007) draws attention to a series
of variables and attributes thought to affect self-organization. The
most important variables range from the simple number of users,
degree of heterogeneity of the socioeconomic attributes, access
to technology and dependence on shared resources, to the differ-
ent levels of knowledge of the SESs, the possible discrepancy of
the mental models of action-outcome linkages, degree to which
norms and world views are shared, degree of trust, trustworthi-
ness and reciprocity, and users’ attitudes in relation to leadership
and entrepreneurship.
When addressing, in particular, the interplay between cogni-
tion, belief systems, valuations and institutions, the Bloomington
School assimilates and advances the framework provided by the
brand new“cognitive institutionalism,” as termed by Mantzavinos
et al. (2004).
Cognitive institutionalism is based on an image of the mind
as a complex structure which actively interprets and at the same
time classiﬁes the varied signals received by the senses. Updated
interpretations and categorizations are conﬁgured as a series of
“mental models” of the action situation, and are understood as
ﬂexible knowledge structures which “gradually evolve during our
cognitive development to organize our perceptions and keep track
of our memories” (Mantzavinos et al., 2004, p. 76).
A pragmatic notion of a mental model, as “the ﬁnal prediction
that the mind makes or expectation that it has regarding the envi-
ronment before getting feedback from it,” and a behaviorist-like
reasoning are adopted to posit the mechanism according to which
a given mental model is likely to evolve “according to the feed-
back received from the environment” (ibid; see Figure 3). In this
formulation, a “belief” is a “relatively crystallized mental model,”
which has become stabilized “when environmental feedback con-
ﬁrms the same mental model many times.”A“belief system” is just
the interconnection of beliefs, which can nonetheless be either
consistent or inconsistent with such feedbacks. As the authors
explain:
Because the mind actively interprets all sensory input, the message
regarding the success or failure of the solution attempted will often be
misinterpreted. Indeed, the persistence throughout history of dogmas,
myths, superstitions, and ideologies based on suchﬂawedbelief systems
calls us to pay as much attention to learning that produces such beliefs
as we do to learning that appears to interpret correctly the problems
confronting humans (Mantzavinos et al., 2004, p. 76).
The schema is illustrated in Figure 3, which already includes
the additions made by Ostrom (2005) to account for two aspects
related to the communication opportunities. However, without
adding anything substantially different from Hobbes’s original
conception of practical rationality, the authors’ interpretation of
the truth-value of alternative beliefs hangs clearly on the “old”
representationalist theory of cognition and the corresponding
monological (foundationalist) model of justiﬁcation. From this
epistemological standpoint, the complex problem related to the
likelihood of ﬁnding self-organized solutions for collective action
dilemmas is just that the individuals involvedmay comewithdiver-
gent “mental models” of the action situation, and with divergent
and purely subjective normative orientations or preferences on
how the dilemma should be solved.
It is at this point that communication emerges as a potentially
helpful recourse. However, since the instrumental conception of
rationality, underlying the entire analysis, does not support the
idea of rational justiﬁcation of normative principles, communica-
tion cannot help in this regard and is inevitably reduced to a vehicle
of information exchange: a formof strategic interaction (Figure 1)
by way of which the agents obtain additional information, based
on the experience of others, about likely action-outcome linkages
and the feedback they obtain from a situation. Repeated exchange
of information could make different mental models converge and
thus facilitate coordination (cf. Denzau and North, 2000). When
considering the forms and contents of what may be communi-
cated, Frohlich and Oppenheimer (2001) point to the elements of
vividness and salience, which Ostrom (2005), in turn, incorporates
into the schema of Figure 3.
By taking a position according to which “paying attention is
costly,”Frohlich andOppenheimer explain the importance of these
attributes in driving individuals’ attention within the variety of
signals they receive.
In order for something to grab one’s attention it must displace some-
thing else to which one is attending. To accomplish this, a new focus
of attention must have a higher claim. Attention shifts from one object
of attention to another as if there were a threshold of value attached to
the former which has to be surpassed for the competitor to displace it
(Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 2001, p. 8).
While there is nothing wrong with this construction, as far
as it goes, it is clearly cramped by the exclusively instrumen-
tal account. Since the epistemological underpinning has already
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FIGURE 3 |The impact of communication, vividness, and salience on the relationship between information, action-outcome linkages, and internal
mental models. Source: Ostrom (2005).
ruled out the internal connection between norms and justifying
grounds, the “cognitive institutionalisms” cannot really establish a
straight link between cognition and institutions. Thus limited,
the cognitive capabilities cannot support rational justiﬁcations
for adopting any governance rule in preference to other feasi-
ble alternatives. Correspondingly, the analysis of communication
diverts the focus from the essential normative matter toward that
of correct interpretations of causal chains.
This limitation, however, is not absolute. Once we have
acknowledged Habermas’s epistemological critique, we can dis-
tinguish the contribution from psychology’s developmental per-
spective in interpreting agents’ diverse motivations and styles
of reasoning when discussing alternative norms to regulate
their interactions in social dilemmas. By selecting appropri-
ated models of adult development, researchers studying social
dilemmas can advance testable hypotheses to be falsiﬁed in
well-established experiments. The next section presents our
proposal.
INTEGRATING DISCOURSE ETHICS AND STAGES OF MORAL
AGENCY WITH THE BLOOMINGTON SCHOOL
The proposed integration can be economically outlined by a sim-
ple modiﬁcation of the previous schema shown in Figure 3.
In Figure 4, we use a pictographic representation of Clare
Graves’s (1970) model as the Spiral Dynamics® to symbolize
and summarize the entire previous discussion connecting the
development of communicative action with the tradition of
developmental psychology. In this vein, the small spiral super-
imposed on Habermas’s typology (in the upper left-hand corner
of Figure 4) represents Habermas’s own developmental account
of the human capacity to coordinate interaction using different
standards of choice (Table 1), and according to which commu-
nicative action emerges only in later (post-conventional) stages of
interaction.
According to the summary presented in the previous section,
one can reasonably hypothesize that, faced with the conﬂict of
interests that characterizes social dilemmas, individuals centered
at the preconventional stages of interaction–third stage in Graves’s
model (Table 1)—-will use communication as an opportunity to
trick others, quite in line with Hardin’s account and the standard
game-theoretic prediction. On the other hand, individuals cen-
tered at the conventional stages are expected touse communication
to reinforce conformity to roles and existing systems of norms,
whereas those centered at the discourse stage (post-conventional
mode of coordinating action) are expected to use communication
as an opportunity to discuss alternative governance rules and to
commit themselves to pursue their goals only on the condition of
an agreement7. The presence of these individuals is probably what
explains the regular ﬁndings which attest to the effect of commu-
nication on enhancing cooperation in both laboratory and ﬁeld
experiments.
In the center of Figure 4, the spiral suggests that the internal
drives of human development impose restrictions on how indi-
viduals can revise their “mental models” of the action situation.
On the one hand, centralizations in animistic (second stage), ego-
centric (third), or authoritarian (fourth) modes of thinking and
interacting may explain the “persistence throughout history of
dogmas, myths, superstitions, and ideologies” which bafﬂes the
proponents of cognitive institutionalism. On the other hand, the
ﬂexibility which makes it possible for individuals at the discourse
stage of interaction to combine the basic attitudes correspond-
ing to the objective, social, and subjective worlds, broadens the
7This spiral also reminds us of Graves’s own research on perceptual readiness and
validates his point of view (Graves et al., 1965). According to results in this study, the
attention mechanism that Frohlich and Oppenheimer (2001) identify as driving the
selection of information and perception of the action situation are similarly affected
by the dynamics of inner growth; both the vividness and salience of the perceived
objects depend on the developmental stage of the observer.
www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1528 | 11
Meyer and Braga Cognition and norms
FIGURE 4 |The impact of the development of action logics and
worldviewson individuals’ attitudes toward communication, their
perception of the vividness and salience of information, their limitations
in revising mental models of action-outcome linkages, and their
possible and actually chosen actions. Source: author’s conﬁguration,
adapted from Denzau and North (2000) and Ostrom (2005).
interpretation of the “mental models” and the revision process
illustrated in Figure 4. One can now think not only of revisions
anchored in an objectifying attitude faced with the action situa-
tion but also of a revision of norm-conformative and expressive
attitudes toward it.
The spiral next to the “culture” box stands for both the phy-
logenetic aspect of Habermas’s historical reconstruction of the
development of modes of interaction in human societies and
the collective aspect of the ontological recapitulations in the
development of individuals. The relevant aspect to discern is
that while culture certainly inﬂuences and often restricts indi-
vidual movement up the spiral of interior growth it is not its
sole determinant. As Wilber (2000) emphasizes, the multiple
inner structures conﬁguring human interiority have their own
stages of growth and development and are not changed from
the outside. The analytical result is that information about cul-
tural values and belief systems are not a substitute for individual
information.
In summary, the process through which individuals revise
their perceptions of an action situation and then choose an
action to seek a particular outcome (including mutual under-
standing and normative commitments) can allow for the existence
of a structured interiority. New limitations and potential to
change both perceptions and actions arise from the recogni-
tion of the laws of inner transformation. The importance of
acknowledging multiple dispositions and forms of rationality in
analyzing social dilemmas increases with the recognition that
open-ended, multi-stream, complex interior growth is nonethe-
less a process which involves a continuing decline in egocentrism,
increasing autonomy and the increasing ability to take other
people, places, and things into account when making deci-
sions which affect the well-being of others (cf. Wilber, 2000,
2001).
CONCLUDING REMARKS: ON FUTURE RESEARCH AND THE
ROLE OF EDUCATION
The fact that collective action problems involve fundamentally a
moral dilemma is manifest in the opening pages of The Tragedy of
the Commons, which situate the dilemma within a class of prob-
lems whose solution will require a change in human values and
ideas of morality. Yet, Hardin’s standpoint on moral judgments is
purely relativist. He refers to Fletcher’s (1966) Situation Ethics to
reveal what he regards as “a not generally recognized principle of
morality, namely: the morality of an act is a function of the state
of the system at the time it is performed” (p. 1246).
From this perspective, it appears that the role of education is
“to reveal to all” the need to abandon belief in the freedom of the
commons as long as the “state of the system” requires it. Once this
necessity is recognized, “mutual coercion mutually agreed upon”
is Hardin’s proposed solution to the problem.
We have no issue with extracting the rationality of a moral
choice from the recognition of a contingent necessity. Neverthe-
less, we believe that the analysis presented here expands the range
of alternatives and suggests additional directions for education
and research on social dilemmas. Insofar as both communicative
rationality and genuine care for others indicate interior disposi-
tions which emerge later on in the path of human development,
future research should verify the existence of these traits in social
dilemmas using empirical testing. If there is evidence indicat-
ing that groups of individuals centered at later stages of interior
development are better able to cope successfully with their social
dilemmas, then the role of education could include the creation
of favorable conditions for humanity to progress up the spiral of
interior growth. These conditions would eventually eliminate the
need to agree on the necessity of mutual coercion, thus offering
a better response to the concern rooted right at the core of the
Bloomington School of Institutional Theory.
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